Throughout the history of philosophy, from Plato onwards, the presence of the thematic of a certain disconnect between ideas and the world outside of the mind has been present. Schon and Schwab’s respective theories attempt to address this persistent epistemological issue: How can one realize ideas in the real world, and moreover, what is the relationship between ideas and the real world? Schon and Schwab’s accounts essentially attempt to break down this epistemological distinction, through a re-evaluation of some of the presuppositions that underlie the rupture between theory and practice. However, both philosophers go about this in unique ways. Schon emphasizes the ambiguity of practice, whereas Schwab emphasizes the ambiguity of theory.

In Schon’s theory, he directly criticizes the assumption that the world of practice is one that lacks ambiguity according to its presupposed lucidity, in contrast to the chaotic and speculative nature of ideas. Accordingly, Schon writes that, “the problems of real-world practice do not present themselves to practitioners as well-formed structures. Indeed, they tend not to present themselves as problems at all but as messy, indeterminate situations.” (1987, p. 4) Theory as the life of the mind essentially introduces order in the world, by formulating and attempting to delineate complex situations into understandable terms. As such, practitioners must necessarily be theoreticians, as the problems they face are by no means lucidly defined. The split between theory and practice and the general epistemological distinction between mind and world is essentially an illusion, as both aspects of the binary inform each other. In other words, Schon overcomes epistemological dualism by fusing theory and practice.

Schwab’s view of practice is diametrically opposed to that of Schon’s. In the context of a discussion on educational theory, he writes that, “the practical is ineluctably concrete and particular.” (1971, p. 2) Thus, pace Schon, Schwab stresses that practical problems always possess a reality and a singularity of their own. They are something that confronts the practitioner or the theoretician in a relatively direct manner: The effect of the practical is thus not ambiguous, because it presents a concentrated effect that is not ambivalent. The distinction between theory and practice can be broken down by understanding how theory can “systematize” these particular incidents. Hence, when confronted by the direct force of a practical problem in its singularity, theory allows for a certain approach to this directness by an organization of this problem. This organization, however, must also be particular, following the particularity and singularity of the practical problem. In this way, theory in its ideal form needs to mimic the particularity of the practical, thus destroying the distinction between the two in place of a symmetrical identity.

Thus, whereas Schon and Schwab view an essential complimentary quality between theory and practice, they both possess radically different views on this relation. In this regard, some of the following questions can be asked:

1)    Does it make sense to maintain a distinction between theory and practice, if the aims of these approaches are to undermine such a distinction? In other words, perhaps this is an illusory distinction?

2)    In the work and management setting, how can we distinguish between theoretical and practical problems? An apparently practical problem may be really the result of a theoretical misunderstanding and vice versa, thus blurring this division even further.

3)    In the current management world, does the systems thinking approach not better fit the unique demands of this paradigm, insofar as management can be viewed as a combination of theory and practice which yields something greater than merely theory and practice in the sense of systems theory’s emphasis on holism?